Coffee With Pierre

CAN WE UNDERSTAND PARMENIDES' POEM?
By Kenneth Callen King
December 29, 1986

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this paper to Dr. Pierre Grimes who acting as a philosophical midwife,

guided my study in a series of private discussions.

CAN WE UNDERSTAND PARMENIDES' POEM?

Parmenides of Elea (c.5OO B.C.) wrote a poem in the Epic hexameter of Homer and Hesiod. Thus he was appealing to their audience and introducing philosophy in a religious context, in competition with them. The poem contains one of the earliest extended discourses on Being and Truth. Much of that was copied out by Simplicius in his Commentary on the physics of Aristotle.

Heidegger, writing in Being and Time places the Poem, "at the beginning of the ontological tradition which has been decisive for us". Discussing the third fragment,

"To gar auto noein estin te kai einai"

he gives the meaning as follows,

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding," Heidegger continues, "and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of Western Philosophy ever since."

In the past Century there has been considerable interest in the poem and there have been several translations of and commentaries on the fragments, (2) (the original poem having been lost leaving only those fragments which had been copied by various writers in the course of history.)

Three factors seem to have stimulated interest in the Greeks, and Parmenides in particular. First a general interest in 'Being' probably stimulated by Hegel's Science of Logic, second the writing of Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, and third publication of Hermann Diels Fragments of the Pre-Socratics (1903)

Although there is considerable interest in the poem there has been difficulty in understanding it, that is seeing how it's parts fit together into an intelligible whole. In the first fragment there is an outline of the main body of the poem beginning at line 28,

"It is right for you to learn all things, Both the calm heart of well rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals among which there is no persuasive truth."

This sentence clearly indicates two parts of the poem, by the word 'both'.

It is followed by a notoriously ambiguous sentence, the first four words of which may be translated in two ways, (3) One was as continuing the discussion of the opinions of mortals, the other as adding a new topic to be learned, and thus indicating a third part.

All translators and commentators read it as continuing the discussion of the second part and assert that there are two parts to the poem. But apparently the two parts do not fit together into an intelligible whole.

The commentators frustrations are most succinctly expressed by J.E. Raven of Cambridge who writes,(4)

"We should not waste time in the hopeless attempt to reconcile the two parts."

I will show that there is third part, distinct from the two above mentioned, which has been overlooked, and which enables us to render the whole intelligible.

There will be two benefits from the demonstration, first when we see that the Poem can be understood, we will be better able to appreciate Parmenides position in the History of Philosophy, and secondly, upon reflecting on the error mentioned at Fragment a line 50 - 59, we will come to appreciate how it is that so many have failed to understand Parmenides Poem. The commentators agree on the following division; (5)

Prologue Fragment 1.
Part I Fragments 2-8 (to line 49)
Part II Fragments 8 (from line 50) - 19.

I will discuss Fragment a (to line 49) first as it is the main discourse on Being and Truth. Then I will discuss the commentator's part II and introduce my distinction of part III. Finally we will return to a consideration of the Prologue.

Fragment 8 begins with the goddess telling the youth

"There remains but one myth of the way, Is."

Myth is different for Archaic Greece than for modern Europe, it is not "what some people used to believe", but rather as Jaeger (6) says,

"Myth and heroic poetry are the nations inexhaustible treasure of great examples: from them it derives its ideals and its standards for daily life. . .myth for the early Greeks, was the supreme idealizing factor."

As myths occur in the Epic poems of Homer and Hesiod, presenting a heroic archetype, so in the philosophical epic of Parmenides the Way of Truth is revealed in a myth which becomes the philosophers archetype in his quest for Being.

She begins her myth by discussing its signs,

"On this way there are many signs, that Being is ungenerated, and indestructible, complete, unique and both calm and perfect. It neither was nor will be, since it 1S now altogether, one, embracing."

First let us consider the signs. As signs of spring anticipate the spring but are not spring, so signs of being anticipate being but are not Being. Thus Being is discussed but not directly spoken of, the goddess uses signs and a simile.

Being is one. Not one among many but unique. It has no beginning, it is unborn, so it does not become. It is timeless, since it neither was nor will be, and being timeless, it never will be destroyed. It simply is.

As for the signs, "complete, unique, calm and perfect" she says later (at line 29) that,

"Remaining always the same and in the same place by itself it stays fixed where it is, For strong Necessity holds it in bonds of limit which constrain it on all sides. Natural Law forbids that Being should be other than perfectly complete. It stands in need of nothing for if it needed anything at all it would need everything."

Clearly, something which stays fixed where it is, is calm. It is asserted that being is perfectly complete and we shall see later that it must be unique, for there is no not being so that there could be anything apart from Being.

In the passage just quoted the goddess mentions 'bonds of limit'. What is the nature of these bonds of limit? Are they spatial or non-spatial? (7) Many read it as spatial and treat being as a spatial whole. We will soon see that this is reinforced by a literal reading of the simile of the well rounded sphere. There is a fallacy of equivocation involved here. One might say, since Being is limited, and whatever is limited is a spatial whole, that Being must be a spatial whole.

But there is another sense of limit which includes the idea of perfect completeness and standing in need of nothing. This sense of limit does not imply a spatial whole.

Consider a Bach Fugue. It is perfect as it is, it needs nothing and would be incomplete if one subtracted from it. It would also be ruined if one added to it. The same idea may be seen in other works of art, painting and sculpture for instance. One would not add to or take away from Michelangelo's sculpture or Leonardo's painting. It is therefore this sense of limit which I say fits here, rather than the spatial sense.

The goddess uses the idea of limit to introduce the simile of the well-rounded sphere,

"Since there has to be limit, Being is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced in every direction from the center. Clearly it cannot be greater in any direction than in any other, in as much as there is no not-being to prevent it from reaching out equally, nor is it the nature of Being to be more here and less there. The all is inviolable. Since it is equal to itself in all directions, it must be homogeneous within the limits"

The use of the word 'like' indicates that we have a simile, not a literal statement. When we say "the King is like a shepherd," we do not mean that he literally is a shepherd, but rather we indicate some likeness in the two roles, such as care for a flock. To take Being as a spatial whole is to read the simile as a literal statement. Aristotle, writing in the Physics (207a 16) 8 says,

"whereas Melissus speaks of the Whole as unlimited, Parmenides offers a more acceptable view in declaring that the Whole is limited and extends equally in every direction from the center."

He thus read the simile as a literal statement and so have subsequent philosophers, for instance Sartre in Being and nothingness,9 writes about "the density, the uniform and spherical plenitude of Parmenidean Being."

Since "there is no not-being to prevent it from reaching out equally", Being cannot be a spatially limited whole, literally a sphere. For then outside of Being would be not being.

The simile of the well-rounded sphere indicates the homogeneous oneness of Being, "not more here nor less there' but rather all 'continuous'.

When we consider the 4th Fragment of the poem we can see that it carries on the idea of continuity.

"Gaze steadfastly at things which, though far away, are yet present to the mind. For you cannot cut off being from being: it does not scatter itself throughout the universe nor does it gather together."

If Being were literally a spherical whole it would 'gather together', but it does not do so.

'Gaze' is gazing with the mind, not the eyes. We can see this when we consider the 3rd fragment which I have retranslated.

Heidegger, following the first sentence in Aristotle's Metaphysics, (10) which he renders as 'the care for seeing is essential to man's being.' thinks the fragment is about beholding. But I disagree.

As I translate it, Fragment 3 reads,

"For Intellection and Being are the same."

This connects Being to Intellection, that is the act of perceiving with the mind. Noein has a range of meaning according to the lexicon. It ranges from perception by the senses to intellectual perception.

Mourelatos writes, (11)

"noein functions in Parmenides not as a psychological but as an epistemic term •..it expresses the incisive and sure apprehension of what-is or truth."

This kind of apprehension occurs in mathematical and dialectical insights where one is judging by reason. The goddess has encouraged the youth to judge by reason and the mythos has become a logos, a trustworthy rational discourse.

At line 50 of fragment 8, the goddess pauses to discuss the opinions of mortals. This is where commentators mark the beginning of the second part of the poem.

"Here I bring to a close my trustworthy rational discourse concerning truth. Learn next about the opinions of men, as you listen to the deceptive ordering of my words. For men have established the habit of naming two thought-forms; therein they have erred, because the unity of the forms is not rightfully named."

I have read mian as unity (12) rather than as one, because what is overlooked in a duality such as night and day or male and female is not one of the terms, but the unity that binds them together.

The poem continues,

"They have distinguished contraries in form and signs and assumed that they were separate from one another. On the one hand, there is the fire of the upper sky, gentle, rarefied, and everywhere identical with itself: on the other hand there lies opposed to it utter darkness, dense and heavy."

We have an example of distinguishing contraries, in the distinction of light and night. Contrast the sunny sky on a clear day with the darkness of a cloudy night. The error is not in the distinction, but rather in the assumption of separation.

F.H. Bradley writing in Appearance and Reality (13) discusses distinction and separation,

"What we certainly do not find is a subject or an object or indeed any other thing whatever, standing separate and on its own bottom. What we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made but in which divisions do not exist."

How often do we see the assumption of separation made, with male and female, black and white races, the generation gap. Those who erroneously make the assumption of separation ignore that which unifies the contraries, the whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist.

At Fragment 8 line 60 the goddess introduces a correction to this error. She introduces the third part of the poem, "the probable order of all things" .

"I tell you the probable order of all things so that no opinion of mortals will ever surpass yours."

She is going to discuss the order (diakosmon) of all things. Since it is merely probable, it does not reach Truth but it is such that 'no opinion of mortals will ever surpass yours' that is it is in the mean position. She does not say that he will be able to keep up with mortals as if his was just another opinion alongside theirs, but rather so that no opinion of mortals will ever surpass his. His account will stand out from theirs, because he will always be able to point cut their error and correct it.

First I will show that subsequent Fragments may be included in the third part as having the unique feature of pointing out that which unifies the contraries.

Then I will relate the third part to the Timaeus and the 'likely story'.

It will be easiest to see my point if we consider first Fragment 10;

"You will come to know the nature of the (upper) sky and the signs of the sky, and the unseen works of the pure bright torch of the sun, and how they Came into being. You will learn the nature of the round eyed moon, and its wandering works. You shall know also the encompassing heaven, whence it arose, and how Necessity grasped and chained it to hold the limit of the stars."

I have purposely isolated the three structural elements. The three sentences begin the same way, but we can distinguish them because of elements contained in them. The first mentions the upper sky and the sun, reminding us of one of the contraries in the opinions of mortals. The second mentions the moon which wanders about the earth at night, reminding us of the other contrary. But in the third sentence a new feature is mentioned, "the encompassing heaven" which embraces both light and night in one cosmos.

The pattern repeats itself throughout fragments 9 - 18 in which contraries are mentioned but that which binds them into a unity is pointed out.

For instance, we have mentioned male and female as another pair of contraries which often are assumed to be separate, considered biologically we see something different.

In Fragment 18 we read,

"When woman and man mix the seeds of love together the power that results from the mingling of different bloods, if it preserve harmony, fashions a well-formed body."

Each person then has a body which is a product of both male and female seed. So we see in a biological model what we had seen before in the cosmological model, that where mortals distinguish contraries and assume them to be separate, the 'man who knows' can point out that which binds them into a unity. Parmenides is called 'the man who knows,' a mean between the ignorance of mortals and the wisdom of the goddess, and so beside the revelation of the Way of Truth and the brief comment about the error of mortals, he carries with him the account of the probable order of all things.

Those who distinguish the Way of Truth and the Opinions of Mortals as contraries, assume them to be separate and do not perceive the probable order of all things as a mean between the two. They reason that since there is no truth cut merely probability in the accounts in fragments 9 - 18 those accounts are not different from the other opinions.

It is a different case in the Timaeus. (14) For there we find the analogy;

"As Being is to becoming, so Truth is to opinion."

Whatever is perceptible by the senses, never really is but is always becoming. So that in speaking of the perceptible universe, Timaeus proposes that,

"We ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further."

Those who confuse Being and becoming, likewise confuse truth and opinion. Indeed modern philosophers think that Being is the being-of-beings, or the being of phenomena and that accounts of phenomena can contain Truth. This is the main thrust of phenomenology and transcendental logic and the Cartesian quest for Certainty. So as I said such thinkers would not find a merely probable account better than the opinions of mortals 'among which there is no persuasive truth' and so they wonder why Parmenides bothered to write about the opinions.

We can see therefore that the third part contains some hints at 'saving the appearances' and therefore places the Poem in the Tradition of Plato's Timaeus with it's likely story. This has generally been overlooked.

Indeed Heidegger projected a section in Being and Time (15) in which he was to discuss "Why the phenomenon of the world was passed over . . .in the case of Parmenides." If fragments 9-18 were merely more erroneous opinions, and not saving the appearances, then Heidegger would be right in saying the phenomenon of the world was passed over. But as we claim, it is a case of saving the appearances, then we conclude that Heidegger overlooked it, and wrongly asks why the phenomenon of the world was passed over.

Beside the philosophical and scientific dimension, there is also, pervading the poem and especially the prologue, a religious and moral dimension. But it is a rational religion not one of faith, it is a revelation by a goddess of a teaching concerning truth and being, with an injunction to carry the tale to others.

Being is described in the poem in the same terms used by Diotima in the Symposium (16) to describe Beauty. For there she describes 'the final object' as, “Always being, neither coming to be nor perishing, neither waxing nor waning ... ' When Being is perceived it is perceived as Beauty. Thus as Socrates is initiated into the mysteries of Love and Beauty by Diotima, so Parmenides is initiated into the mysteries of Being and Truth by the Goddess.

The poem is in the epic style of Homer and Hesiod and contains phrases which echo their poems.17 But Parmenides is introducing philosophy in his poem and so some of the images have been transmuted. This would have a dramatic effect upon the hearers of the poem who would associate the words with the old poems but find them used in a new way. We already saw that they would be amazed at his ability to point out the errors in their accounts and to correct them and they would see him within the context of Greek religion, only presenting a rational system. Indeed the system that he presents is unparallel in religious history.

The prologue describes a journey from the halls of night and the cities of men, into the light, where the youth meets a goddess.

The youth does not go alone, but is escorted by mares and chariot and maidens who lead the way, having been sent forth on the way by Dike and Themis,(justice and right order.)

Mourelatos (18) tells us that the Homeric host owed certain duties to his guest, to provide a vehicle and guides, to describe the signs along the way and to give directions about which road to take. All of these occur in the poem.

The youth is referred to as 'the man who knows' we have already seen that he is thus a mean between mortals and the goddess. Indeed his journey is a link between the two, the completion of the link is symbolized by the goddess taking his hand and welcoming him. She subsequently sends him back to the cities of men where he is to carry with him the myth. So in this way too, he links the goddess and mortals.

The chariot rolls on two whirling wheels which turn round an axel. Here a two is held together by a one. Likewise the two doors of the gate are embraced by one lintel and a stone threshold. if one were mesmerized by a dualistic vision he would write volumes about the two wheels and two doors as evidence of the dualism of truth and opinion, and ignore the axel and the lintel and threshold which unite the two wheels and two doors.

In Hesiod the gates of night and day are in the underworld(19), but in this poem they are in the light. This is an example of transmutation of symbols. We must beware say-ing that because Hesiod put the gate in the underworld, that is where they must be.

Dike also was originally in the underworld but later came to be located in Olympus. She personifies Justice and it is only because the youth has himself been just that he has come to her gate and that the maidens may persuade her to open doors of the gate.

The goddess who instructs the youth begins by saying,

"It is right for you to learn all things"

so there 1S no knowledge withheld. This puts the poem in contrast to the Judea-Christian tradition in which partaking of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is the original sin. It is in fact the only religious piece which reveals a rational teaching, not dependent on faith.

We began by saying that the first fragment ended with two lines which could either indicate the continuation of the second part of the poem ('but nevertheless even these you will learn') or the addition of a third topic ('and in the same way also these you will learn'). Our analysis has distinguished the third part, the probable order of all things. Therefore the decision about the lines is for the addition of a third topic. This is reinforced by the use of a different word for 'learn'. The prior word was 'puthesthai’ which indicates to learn by hearing, a mode of learning appropriate to hearing a revelation about Being and a criticism of the opinions of mortals. The word in line 31 is 'matheiseai' which indicates to learn by study, the proper mode of learning for studying the probable order of all things. my translation of lines 31 & 32 of Fragment I is,

"And in the same way also, you will learn these things how the appearances rightfully appear to be, all being in the midst of each."

Mortals have opinions about the appearances, and then there is ' how the appearances rightfully appear to be' which I identify with the probable order of all things, or the third part of the poem. 'All being in the midst of each' is to indicate not that any thing is, but that there is no where that Being is not. No thing may be taken as existing separately and independently, so no thing is. But there is no where that Being is not. This is a rational mystery.

I conclude this paper on the Poem, having shown that it can in fact be understood, when we distinguish the third part which stands as a mean between the first two. I have indicated that Parmenides rightfully is regarded as standing at the beginning of the ontological tradition of the West, but that following Aristotle, he has been little understood. I have also indicated that there is the role of saving the appearances which has been over looked. We also noted that the poem serves to introduce philosophy, and the philosopher, For the youth would appear to his hearers as one who was indeed wise, since he could easily point out the errors in their thinking on whatever matters, and could even show them how to correct their errors. And he would appear to them just, since he was guided by Themis and dike. And when he spoke to them of the Way of Truth, the meter of his recitation would remind his hearers of Homer and Hesiod and so put his discourse into a profound religious context. So as I said he would appear to them to be wise, whereas in fact he would be in that mean position between ignorance and wisdom, in the role of the philosopher.

By this paper I hope to have shown that the poem can be understood and that it would be worthwhile to return to the roots of our Ontological tradition and seek to understand it anew. For neither those who believed they were carrying on the Western Ontological Tradition which began with Parmenides
nor those who have opposed it such as the logical positivists have rightly understood these roots. As a result we find two camps, one making absurd assertions about Being, and the other rejecting what is essentially a straw man. It is no wonder that Metaphysics does not flourish in the 20th Century No, it is time to return to the roots and reconsider carefully, and with proper attention, perhaps a rational ontology may yet flourish.

NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962 pp.133, and 215.

2. I found Taran's Parmenides (Princeton 1963) most usable for text, translation and commentary. My favorite translation was Wheelwright's. Cornford (Plato and Parmenides) is only partial as is Raven's. Kathleen Freeman's Ancilla to the Presocratics contains a complete translation. Mourelatos Commentary, The Route of Parmenides has some interesting data in it about Epic-Poetry, and contains a complete text. However he only translates selected passages. I also looked at Guthrie's commentary in his History of Greek philosophy Volume II

3. In line 31 "all' empeis kai tauta" each of the words is ambiguous, having the possibility of referring forward or backward. When one looks in the Lexicon for examples of the phrase used in Epic poetry, one is directed to examples such as Hesiod Works and Days 178 where speaking of the iron race, he says, “But, notwithstanding, even these shall have some good mingled with their evils." This use is concessive. It probably influenced translations of the first four words in line 31, for Taran, Raven, and Mourelatos all translate them with the concessive sense. I looked at the line from the structuralist viewpoint, that is how it functioned to indicate the actual structure of the poem, therefore I chose the other translation.

4. G.S.Kirk & J.E.Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1962. Pages 284-?S.

5. Cornford (p. 30) says, "The Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming (as we may call it) are the two divisions of the poem" In this he is in agreement with the others. Wheelwright labels the two parts, 'the Way of Truth' and 'the Way of Opinion'.

6. Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Translated by Gilbert Highest, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965. Page 41.

7. Page 3. Bonds of limit. Mourelatos (p.28) and Guthrie (p. 38) have interesting discussions of 'peirata'.
Taran (p.1S0 ff) distinguishes logical vs. spatial senses of 'limit'. He also points out, regarding the simile of the sphere, that "Plato most probably did not take the comparison to imply that Being is spherical. Aristotle probably interpreted the comparison as implying the material existence of Being as a sphere."

8. Aristotle, Physics (207a16), quoted in Wheelwright, the Pre-Socratics, New York, The Odyssey Press, Inc. , 1J66, page 102.

9. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Translated by Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1956, page 613.

10. Heidegger, Op. cit. page 213.

11. Alexander P.O. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970, page 164.

12. Mourelatos (p. 83 ff) concurs with the translation of mian as unity. Wheelwright translates it as 'one' -of- which indicating that the error of morta1s was in naming one of the contraries.

13. F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1966, page 128.

14. Plato, Timaeus, Translated by The Rev. R.G. Bury, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1961, page 53.

15. Heidegger, Op. cit. page 133.

16. Plato, Symposium, Translated by W.R.M. Lamb, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1961, page 205.

17. Mourelatos gives the most data on the style of Homer and Hesiod, including (p. 8) a list of parallel constructions Taran cautions us in his commentary regarding echoes of Homer and Hesiod against assuming that a phrase is always used the same in Parmenides and his predecessors.

18. Mourelatos, Op. cit. page 17.

19. Hesiod, Theogony 748 ff. in Hesiod the Homeric Hymns and Homerica, translated by Hugh G. Evelyn White, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1977, page 133.